Tax audit productivity in New York State by Niu, Yongzhi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Tax audit productivity in New York
State
Yongzhi Niu
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance
12. November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26654/
MPRA Paper No. 26654, posted 13. November 2010 14:52 UTC
Tax Audit Productivity in New York State 
 
Yongzhi Niu, Ph.D.
1
 
New York State Division of the Budget 
 (e-mail: bdniu@budget.state.ny.us) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study employs both linear and non-linear approaches to examine tax audit productivity in 
New York State.  The linear approach shows a positive relationship between audit revenue and the 
number of audit staff within the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance’s Audit 
Division.  Using a narrower definition of “direct staff” which excludes upper level supervisors 
(staff at grade level 27 or higher, we find that the impact of an additional auditor is $590 
thousand; using a broader definition of “direct staff”, which includes upper level supervisors 
(staff at grade level 27 or higher), the impact is $496 thousand.  The non-linear approach 
discovers the diminishing marginal returns.  At the current direct staff level (877 as of November 
2008, the narrower definition) in the Audit Division, the marginal return of an extra direct staff 
member is $602 thousand, which is consistent with the results of the linear model.  The results 
also show that in order to maximize net audit revenue the State needs to increase the number of 
auditors to 1,522, assuming the marginal cost of an additional auditor is constant at $200 
thousand.  The non-linear model provides a convenient way to determine the optimal level of staff, 
given the marginal cost of an additional auditor. Hence policymakers can use this non-linear 
model as a tool to maximize the State’s net audit revenue.   
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the tax audit productivity in New York State.  The purpose of this study is 
to help tax practitioners and policymakers better understand the relationship between the audit 
effort and the audit revenue generated by the effort, which, in turn, may help policymakers to 
better structure the audit organization to meet expectations of the public and to generate more 
revenue for the State.  
In the literature, researchers traditionally use the tax deficiency as the audit output.  Some of 
these researchers use the tax deficiency per hour of audit effort and others use total deficiency as 
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the dependent variable.  For example, see Adams (1987) and Sinha (2007). The current study, 
however, uses the audit revenue collections instead of the tax deficiency and uses the number of 
audit staff in the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (DTF) instead of audit 
hours.   
 
There are two advantages for using audit revenue collections and the number of staff.  First, it 
avoids using the firm level data, which researchers have traditionally used in their studies.  When 
using firm level data, both the input (audit effort) and output (tax deficiency) refer to the actions 
taken against a particular firm, i.e., input is the hours auditors work on that firm and output is the 
difference between the true tax liability and the reported tax liability of that firm.  The audit 
effort spent in the audit selection process (to choose which firms to audit) is often ignored and, as 
a result, the tax audit productivity may be overstated.  In this study, we use the number of audit 
staff in DTF as the input and, therefore, the input includes effort spent both in the firm selection 
process and in the actual audit process.   
 
Second, the audit revenue collections reflect the real audit output.  Theoretically, tax deficiency 
and audit revenue collections should be equal in the long run.  In reality, however, the difference 
between these two measures may be huge due to various reasons.  For example, in the collection 
stage, a firm may declare bankruptcy after an assessment, or an individual may move to another 
state without trace, or the State may lose in legal proceedings.  All of these may cause the tax 
deficiency to deviate from audit revenue collections.   As a result, audit revenue collections are a 
better concept to measure the tax audit productivity. 
 
Many alternative approaches to find the relationship between audit effort and audit revenue 
collections are explored in our research.  In this paper, results of two types of models will be 
presented.  In the first, linear models are used to examine which audit effort measures have the 
closest relationship with audit revenue collections and to quantify the impact of the audit effort.  
In the second, non-linear models are used to check if the current number of auditors in DTF is at 
the optimal level, i.e. whether DTF should decrease or increase auditors to maximize net audit 
revenue collections (gross revenue collections minus cost).  
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections.  Section 2 introduces data used in this 
study.  Section 3 discusses modeling methodology.  Section 4 presents estimation results, and 
Section 5 completes the paper with a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 Audit Output 
For the audit output data, the State share of audit revenue collections is used in this study.  The 
data are maintained by Office of Tax Policy Analysis (OTPA) within DTF.  While the audit 
amount assessed by the Audit Division is also available as explained in the Introduction, it is 
recognized that a portion of the assessed value may never be realized.  Therefore, the State share 
of audit collections is considered a better measure of audit output.   
2.2 Audit Effort 
DTF maintains two measures of audit effort.  One measure is staff counts and working hours 
collected by Human Resources Management for payroll purposes.  The data have a short span, 
from 2005 to 2007.  The other measure is monthly staff counts by staff functions listed in the 
Monthly Report, prepared by Office of Tax Enforcement (OTE).  The staff data in the Monthly 
Report are chosen as audit effort measures in this study because of the data’s longer span, from 
2000 to 2008, and because the staff listed in the data could be easily classified into direct staff 
and indirect staff without much ambiguity. 
Within DTF, the Office of Tax Enforcement is responsible for both civil enforcement and 
criminal enforcement.  It contains five divisions, including the Audit Division.  Figure 1 presents 
the organizational structure of OTE. 
 
Figure 1.  Organizational Structure of Office of Tax Enforcement 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
In this study, alternative staff aggregates in OTE are defined as audit effort measures.  The 
following describes these aggregates, in that OTE staff is classified into different categories 
according to the function of the staff.  See Appendix I for a detailed discussion of the staff 
classification in the Audit Division and CCED.  
 
a. Direct staff vs. indirect staff  
 
AD and CCED are the two divisions which are most closely related to the actual audit work 
among all the divisions in OTE.  Based on the Monthly Report for November 2008, the staff in 
Office of Tax Enforcement (OTE) 
Audit 
Division 
(AD) 
Collections & Civil 
Enforcement 
Division (CCED) 
Special 
Investigation 
Unit (SIU) 
Investigation & 
Criminal Enforcement 
Division (ICED) 
Data Resources 
Division (DRD) 
these two divisions account for 95 percent of the total OTE Staff while the other divisions 
account for only 5 percent.  The staff in both AD and CCED are divided into direct staff and 
indirect staff according to their job functions, while the staff in the other divisions are regarded 
as indirect staff. 
b. Two measures of direct staff 
The broader definition (D1) is the direct staff which includes staff members at grade level 27 or 
higher; the narrower definition (D2) consists of direct staff which excludes staff members at 
grade level 27 or higher, i.e., D2 includes only staff who do actual audit work and excludes 
managers who supervise auditors. 
 
c. Technical support staff vs. administrative support staff  
 
The indirect staff in AD and CCED are further classified into two categories, technical support 
staff and administrative support staff based on the nature of their work within these divisions.   
 
d. Other audit effort measures 
Besides the aggregates of staff within each of the two divisions defined above, we also tried 
other aggregates as audit effort measures in our research, including: 
T1: Total staff in Audit Division; 
T2: Total staff in CCED; 
T3: Total staff in the Audit Division and CCED;    
T4: Total staff in the Office of Tax Enforcement. 
  
2.3 Economic Indicators 
Economic situations affect tax audit revenue collections.  In a booming economy, audit 
collections tend to increase due to increased economic activities.   For example, the increase in 
wages may boost personal income tax revenue and the increase in retail sales transactions may 
boost the sales tax revenue.  If the tax evasion ratio is constant, then the increased economic 
activities would cause the audit revenue collections to rise, even if the audit effort remains 
constant. 
Several economic indicators are tried to control the effect of the economic situations on the audit 
revenue collections.  One of the indicators is the New York State Economics Coincident 
Indicator published by the New York State Division of Budget (Megna and Xu, 2003), as the 
Indicator is supposed to capture the general economic situations in the State.  Another indicator 
is the total wages of New York State (Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics), as the sales 
tax and personal income tax are closely tied to the total State wages.  We also tried New York 
State wages in the private sector, New York State personal income, New York State disposable 
income, and US gross domestic product. (Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
 
3. Modeling Methodology 
In the modeling process, we want our models to be statistically fit and structurally simple.  Also, 
we want our models to be capable of answering the following questions: 
1. Is there a positive relationship between the audit output (audit revenue collections) and 
the audit effort (number of staff)? 
2. Which audit effort measures defined in the previous section have the closest relationship 
with the audit output as compared with other measures? 
3. How can we quantify the relationship? 
4. Are there any diminishing returns as the audit effort increases?  If so, what is the optimal 
level of the audit effort? 
Numerous functional forms of both the structural and time series models were tried.  The general 
form of a structural model can be written as  
           
 
         
 
         (E1) 
where y is the audit output, defined as audit revenue collections;  s are measures of audit effort 
in number of staff; and  s represent factors other than audit effort affecting the audit output, such 
as State personal income or total wages.  In addition, dummy variables for data outliers are also 
represented by  s. 
In the modeling process, we tried many variations of Equation E1. The following are some 
examples: 
a. Uncertain about the underlying structure, we tried both the linear and non-linear models; 
 
b. A few variations of y, audit revenue collections, were tried as the dependent variable to 
see if these variations of y could be better explained by our models.  The variations 
include log of y, difference of y, and growth rate of y; 
 
c. For the independent variables,  s, we tested alternative staff measures as defined in the 
previous section.  Also, a few variations of X, such as log of X and difference of X, were 
tried.  For example, we tried the following Cobb-Douglas Production function (log-log 
model): 
 
                                                           (E2) 
  
where the number of direct staff and the number of supporting staff are used as two 
inputs in the production function; 
 
d. Various lags of   s were tried to see if the past behavior of the independent variables 
have an impact on audit revenue collections in the current period; 
 
e. Different orders of AR and MA terms were added to the general structural model to 
correct the serial correlation of the disturbance terms; 
 
 
4. Estimation Results  
A couple of the models and their regression results are presented in this section.  Models 
represented by Equations E3, E4, and E8 are among the best of the models we tried.  They are 
chosen for their parsimonious nature, relatively good power to explain the variations of audit 
revenue collections, and the significant T statistics for the regression coefficients with the signs 
as expected.  Some models with unsatisfactory statistics, represented by Equations E5, E6, and 
E7, are also presented in this section.  They are chosen as examples to show that certain staff 
measures are not good independent variables to explain the variation of the audit revenue 
collections.   
 
4.1 Results of Linear Models 
 
4.1.1  Impact of Audit Division Staff: 
a. The effect of D2, the narrower definition of the direct staff, which excludes auditors at 
grade level 27 or higher: 
 
            
 
         
 
                (E3) 
where 
  = audit revenue collections; 
  = 1; 
   = direct staff at grade level lower than 27; 
  = lagged (lag three) New York State total wages; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in October 2006; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in February 2008. 
 Statistics of Equation E3: 
Adj Rsq                               
0.7132  -545105  590  0.0042  483694  449523 
P value   (0.0099)  (0.0107)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
The statistics shows that this model has significant T statistics for each independent variable and 
is a good fit.  The adjusted R Square, 71.32 percent, is considered high among empirical studies 
in economics, which implies that the predictive ability of this model is good and reliable.  The 
low p-value for each coefficient indicates that the independent variables are significant to 
contribute to the variation of the dependent variable and should not be dropped from the 
modeling.  In addition, the signs of the coefficients are as expected. 
The results show that, as indicated by the coefficient   , an increase of a direct audit staff with 
average ability and average experience will result in an increase of $590 thousand in audit 
revenue collections.   
 
b. The effect of D1, the broader definition of the direct staff, which includes auditors at 
grade level 27 or higher: 
 
            
 
         
 
                (E4) 
 
The functional forms of Equations E4 and E3 are identical.  The only difference between them is 
the definition of   , the staff measure.  In Equation E3,     does not include auditors at grade 
level 27 or higher.  While in Equation E4,     includes all auditors regardless of their grade 
levels.    
  
Statistics of Equation E4: 
Adj Rsq                                
0.7079  -467351  496  0.0036  485997  429111 
P value  (0.0239)  (0.0260)  (0.0001)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
Similar to Equation E3, the statistics shows that Equation E4 has significant T statistics for each 
independent variable and the model is a fair fit.  The results show that, as indicated by the 
coefficient   , an increase of a direct audit staff (including auditors at grade level 27 or higher) 
with average ability and average experience will result in an increase of $496 thousand in audit 
revenue collections.   
c. The effect of T1, total staff  in the Audit Division: 
 
            
 
         
 
                (E5) 
Again, as Equation E4, Equation E5 has the same functional form as Equation E3.  The only 
difference between them is the definition of   , the staff measure.  In Equation E3,     refers to 
direct staff excluding auditors at grade level 27 or higher.  While in Equation E5,     refers to 
total staff in the Audit Division, including both direct staff and supporting staff.     
  
Statistics of Equation E5: 
Adj Rsq                                
0.6985  -542437  300  0.0048  506301  443306 
P value  (0.1237)  (0.1311)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
The results show that T statistics for both the intercept and    are not significant.  The p-value 
for    , 0.1311, indicates that we could not reject the null hypothesis that audit revenue 
collections do not increase with total staff in the Audit Division, i.e., we could not find a positive 
relationship between the staff measure and audit revenue collections at the 90 percent confidence 
level.  
 
d.  The lagged effect of D2, the narrower definition of the direct staff, which excludes 
auditors at grade level 27 or higher: 
It is expected that there is an effect lag between the time when an auditor is added and the time 
when that auditor makes an impact on audit revenue collections.  To test the expectation, we 
build models with different time structures.   Lag one through lag 36 of staff measures are added, 
independently or combined, to the models to check if such lagged staff measures have any 
impact on the audit revenue collections in the current period.  The following is an example of the 
models we tried:  
             
 
         
 
                (E6) 
where  
  = audit revenue collections; 
 
   =  
                                                                                  
                                                 
                   –                                          
   
 
   = lagged (lag three) New York State total wages; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in October 2006; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in February 2008. 
 
Statistics of Equation E6: 
Adj Rsq                                
0.7164  -262992  714  0.0045  507743  492740 
P value  (0.3693)  (0.0259)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
                                       
  -355  272  417  -439  182  -527 
P value   (0.3486)  (0.4720)  (0.2572)  (0.2317)  (0.6251)           (0.1522) 
 
While the adjusted R square is high and T statistics for coefficients,   ,    ,    , and    , is 
statistically significant and with signs as expected, this model suffers several serious flaws.  
First, the T statistics for    is not significant, suggesting we should drop the intercept term from 
the model.  Second, none of the T statistics of the coefficients of the lagged staff measures,    to  
   , is significant, indicating the contribution of lagged staff measures to audit revenue 
collections in the current period cannot be detected.  And third, the signs of the coefficients of 
the lagged staff measure flip over time, implying the model is most likely over-specified.  We 
tried to improve the model by dropping the intercept term.  The results show that the last two 
flaws still exist after the modification.  
We applied various lags of the staff measure (one lag at a time or in different combinations of the 
lags, with longer or shorter time spans, with or without the constant term) to the models.  The 
results of all trials confirm that as long as the current staff measure is included in the models, the 
impact of the lagged staff measures on audit revenue collections cannot be identified.  
 
4.1.2  Impact of Other Staff Measures: 
Besides the staff measures within the Audit Division, some other staff measures are also tested as 
the audit effort variable in our modeling, including: 
1. Direct staff  in CCED; 
2. Total direct staff in CCED and the Audit Division; 
3. Total staff in CCED; 
4. Total staff in CCED and the Audit Division; 
5. Direct and technical support staff in CCED and the Audit Division; 
6. Total staff in OTE. 
The results of the trials show that we could not find satisfactory models with positive 
relationships between these staff measures and audit revenue collections.  The following is an 
example of using total direct staff in the Audit Division and CCED (narrower definition, 
excluding staff at grade level 27 or higher).   
            
 
         
 
                (E7) 
where  
  = audit revenue collections; 
  = 1; 
   = total direct staff of the Audit Division and CCED at grade level lower than 27; 
   = lagged (lag three) New York State total wages; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in October 2006; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in February 2008. 
 
Statistics of Equation E7: 
Adj Rsq                               
0.6954  250199   -178  0.0036  493933  434495 
P value  (0.2623)  (0.2338)  (0.0003)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
The statistics shows that the T statistics of both     and     are insignificant.  Furthermore, the 
sign of the coefficient of   ,      is negative.  All of these indicate that a positive relationship 
between the total direct staff of Audit Division and CCED and audit revenue collections could 
not be detected.  Many alternative models using cross-division staff measures were tried, but 
none of these models could reveal a positive impact of the staff measures on audit revenue 
collections.  
 
4.2  Results of Non-Linear Models 
The linear models presented above assume that there is a constant return of the audit effort, i.e., 
the coefficient of   ,   , is constant over different levels of   .  While the results of the linear 
models are valid, assuming    does not vary much over time, it is worthwhile to relax the 
constant return assumption and try the non-linear approach to examine whether there are 
diminishing returns and, if so, to determine the optimal level of auditors. 
We tried a variety of non-linear models in this research, such as log-log models, semi-log 
models, and quadratic models.  Although the results of most of these models are not satisfactory, 
there is one model that fits the data well.  The specification and regression results of the model 
are presented next. 
 
The effect of D2, the narrower definition of direct staff in the Audit Division, which excludes 
auditors at grade level 27 or higher: 
            
 
 
        
 
                (E8) 
where  
  = audit revenue collections; 
  = direct staff at grade level lower than 27 in the Audit Division; 
  = lagged (lag three) New York State total wages; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in October 2006; 
   = dummy variable for the outlier in February 2008. 
 
Statistics of Equation E8: 
Adj Rsq                               
0.7127  500128  -463000000 0.0043  483891  449345 
P value   (0.0152)  (0.0118)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 The estimation results of the reciprocal model show that this model fits well with significant 
adjusted R Square.  The low p-value for each coefficient indicates that the independent variables 
are significant to contribute to the variation of the dependent variable.  In addition, the signs of 
the coefficients are as expected.  A comparison between Equation E8 and Equation E3 also 
reveals that the coefficients of Zs in these two models are similar. 
One advantage of the reciprocal model is that it gives the limit of y, the dependent variable.  
Also, it allows diminishing returns.  For a detailed discussion about the reciprocal model, see 
Johnston (1984).  To examine diminishing returns, we first exclude the effect of Zs and just 
concentrate on the relationship between Y and X.  From E8, we have  
            
 
 
              (E9) 
where    =         
 
   .  The slope of E9 in the (      dimension is                
  .  
If     is positive, the slope is negative.  If     is negative, as in the case of this model, the slope is 
positive.  Also, if the slope is positive, it decreases as   rises, indicating diminishing returns.  In 
addition, since  
 
 
    as    ,    denotes the limit value for    as   increases.   
The slope               
  is the marginal return of the audit effort.  Given  
   =  463,000,000, we can calculate marginal returns at different levels of    .  Table 1 presents 
the marginal returns for selected Xs in the range from   = 500 to   = 1200. 
Table 1:  Marginal returns of the direct staff in the Audit Division  
Number of Staff,   Marginal Return,       
 , 
Unit: $ thousand 
  
500 1852 
600 1286 
700 945 
800 723 
900 572 
1000 463 
1100 383 
1200 322 
 
The results indeed show diminishing returns.  At the current level of direct staff in the Audit 
Division (877 as of November 2008), the marginal return is $602 thousand, $12 thousand higher 
than the results of the linear model represented by Equation E3. 
If we have the total cost of adding an average auditor, including wages, benefits, and all other 
costs associated with the auditor and his support stuff, we can then calculate the breakeven point, 
at which the marginal return equals to the marginal cost.  For example, assume that the marginal 
cost is a constant at $200 thousand.  Then  
   
 
  
     
            = 1,522 
Using this example, as long as the number of direct staff is less than 1,522, the marginal return is 
always greater than the marginal cost of hiring an additional auditor.  The marginal revenue and 
marginal cost curves are presented in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost  
           
 
In Table 2, the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve intersect at X = 1,522.  
Therefore, the State should increase the number of auditors from the current level, 877, to 1,522 
in order to maximize the net audit revenue collections.  It is clear that the position of the 
equilibrium point is affected by the marginal cost.  If the marginal cost is higher than $200 
thousand, then the State should hire less than 1,522 auditors.  If the marginal cost is lower than 
$200 thousand, then the State should hire more than 1,522 auditors.  
The reciprocal model has a limitation when   is at the low end.  At the low end of  , the 
marginal revenue,   
 
   
 , is extremely high, indicating the model may not be suitable.  
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Fortunately, the extremely low levels of direct staff do not exist during the entire historic period 
we are considering.    
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Many structural and time series modeling methods are explored in our study to detect the impact 
of audit effort on audit revenue collections in New York State.  For the independent variables, 
alternative audit effort measures and economic indicators are tried to explore the relationship 
between them and the audit output.  Regression results of selected models are presented in this 
paper. 
The audit output measure used in this study is different from those used by others in the 
literature.  First, this study uses audit revenue collections while many other studies use total tax 
deficiency or tax deficiency per audit hour as the output measure, which often has the tendency 
to overstate the productivity of the audit effort.  Second, this study uses aggregate total audit 
collections while many others use assessment data at the firm level, in which the cost associated 
with the firm selection process is often ignored.   
There are several findings from this analysis that deserve attention.  First, the analysis reveals 
that direct staff in the Audit Division has a positive relationship with audit revenue collections.  
It is, however, unable to detect a positive relationship between audit revenue collections and 
other audit effort measures, such as direct staff of CCED, direct staff of OTE, or total staff of 
OTE.  The amount of the impact of direct staff in the Audit Division depends on the specific 
staff measures and model specifications.  The linear model shows that for the narrower definition 
of direct staff, which excludes staff at grade level 27 or higher, the impact of an additional 
auditor is $590 thousand; for the broader definition of direct staff, which includes staff at grade 
level 27 or higher, the impact is $496 thousand.  The non-linear model shows that at the current 
staff level, the impact of an additional auditor (narrower definition of the direct staff) is $602 
thousand, which is consistent with the linear model.  These results strongly suggest that an 
increase in direct staff in the Audit Division will boost audit revenue collections well in excess of 
associated cost. 
The second finding of the analysis is that there appears no time lag between the time when an 
auditor is added and the time when there is an impact.  This finding may seem counterintuitive 
until the analysis is reviewed more closely.  The study does not distinguish staff fluctuations 
caused by alterations in hiring patterns from those that result from changes in retention rates.  All 
staff members, therefore, enter the analysis as typical auditors with the average ability and 
average experience.   
The third finding is that we are unable to show how an increase in the number of auditors in the 
past periods affects the audit revenue collections in the current period, as indicated in the 
statistics of Equation E6.  We tried dozens of models similar to equation E6 with alternative 
lagged structures on the right hand side of the equations and all models point to the same 
conclusion:  as long as both the current staff measure and the lagged staff measure appear on the 
right hand side of the equation, the T statistics of the lagged staff measure are always 
insignificant, telling us the lagged staff measure adds nothing to the model.  This finding is 
consistent with the second finding that there is no time lag between the time when an auditor is 
added and the time when there is an impact.  
A final finding of the analysis is the indication of diminishing marginal returns as the number of 
auditors increases, as shown in the non-linear reciprocal model of Equation E8.  The results 
show that in order to maximize net audit revenue the State should increase the number of 
auditors from the current level of 877 to 1,522, assuming the marginal cost of an additional 
auditor is $200 thousand.  The non-linear model provides a convenient way to find out the 
optimal level of staff, given the marginal cost. Hence policymakers can use this non-linear model 
as a tool to maximize the State net audit revenue collections.   
 
APPENDIX I 
Staff Classification in the Audit Division and CCED   
The Staff of the Audit Division and CCED are classified into three groups: direct staff, technical 
support staff, and administrative support staff.  The technical support staff and administrative 
support staff are regarded as indirect staff.  All of these measures are tried in our modeling 
process to determine which measures have a close relationship with audit revenue collections. 
1. Staff in the Audit Division 
 
Direct staff (D1) = TA + PA + IN + CA  
Direct staff (D2) = TA + PA + IN + CA – (staff at grade level 27 or higher) 
Technical support staff = TE + CC + SA + CP + CO  
Administrative support staff = AO + MA + AS + OC +AD 
 
where: 
 
TA = tax auditor 
PA = data processing auditor 
IN = investigator 
TE = tax technician  
CC = calculation clerk 
SA = system aide 
CA = compliance agent 
CO = conflict conciliator 
CP = computer programmer 
AO = associate attorney 
MA = manager 
AS = assistance supervisor 
OC = other clerk 
AD = administrative assistant 
 
D1 is the broader definition of the direct staff which includes auditors at grade level 27 or higher 
and D2 is the narrower definition of the direct staff which excludes auditors at grade level 27 or 
higher. 
 
2. Staff in CCED 
 
Direct staff = TR (grade lower than 27) +TC 
Technical support staff = AC + BS +DP + FA + AA + IT + TT 
Administrative support staff = AO + CK + TM + SV +TR (grade 27 or higher) 
 
where: 
 
TR = tax compliance representative 
TC = telephone collector 
AC = associate statistician 
BS = business system analyst  
DP = dp fiscal system auditor 
FA = financial analyst 
AA = administrative analyst 
IT = IT specialist 
TT = tax technician 
AO = associate attorney 
CK = clerk 
TM = tax compliance manager 
SV = supervisor 
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